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Review OpenSSL 3.1 End of Support

Craig Lorentzen PublicSeen by 102

Disclaimer: I am not directing anyone on the FIPS module to use and/or on your compliance story around FIPS modules and security patching.

OpenSSL recently attained FIPS 140-3 validation of OpenSSL 3.1.2 FIPS Module https://openssl-library.org/post/2025-03-11-fips-140-3/

Version 3.1 will be supported until 2025-03-14 https://openssl-library.org/policies/releasestrat/index.html

I am concerned about what this means for public consumption of a secure OpenSSL FIPS module. I expect that as of the 14th we do not actually stop applying security fixes to 3.1, but it would be good to have more of a guarantee that there will be security fixes available for this FIPS module until the 3.5 Module is approved for use.

Alternatively many could continue to use the 3.0 FIPS module (FIPS 140-2) for their FIPS workloads.

Chris Brych

Hi Craig,

Maybe the ask is to see if OpenSSL will extend the 3.1 support date till September of 2026 when the FIPS 140-2 or OpenSSL 3.0 module goes out of compliance or until the OpenSSL 3.5 release for which FIPS 140-3 certification is planned gets submitted to the CMVP? That could allow consumers of the FIPS module to have a FIPS story until 3.5 gets submitted? Does this seem like a reasonable ask?

Jeff Johnson

Can't the FP 3.1.2 be used with OpenSSL3.5 thereby enabling FIPS 140-3 on the LTS branch of OpenSSL3.5? Just wondering if I am missing something... I usually am :)

Jeff Johnson

Or are you just talking about the FIPS Provider CVE fixes inside the boundary? Since it just got the cert I don't think the EOL of OpenSSL3.1 means the EOL of the FP 3.1.2 but clarity on that would be helpful. It wouldn't make a lot of sense to finally get a FIPS cert and not support the FP IMO.

Craig Lorentzen

To be clear I am suggesting OpenSSL extend 3.1 support until the 3.5 FIPS provider is available; This will ensure that the 140-3 validated FIPS provider continues to receive CVE fix until the replacement 3.5 provider is available for those who wish to use a 140-3 validated module.

Those who are happily consuming the 3.0 FIPS provider (140-2) may continue to consume that with another supported OpenSSL release if they want performance/feature upgrades made since 3.0s release.

Paul Dale

The Corporation BAC call on the 25th included a comment to the effect that the 3.1 FIPS provider will be supported until it is sun setted (most likely five years from submission) but that 3.1 itself won't be. That's workable because, as mentioned, the 3.1 FIPS provider will work just fine with 3.5 and it will continue to do so. Details about how to use a FIPS provider with a different OpenSSL version are included in the documentation.

Norman Ashley

Hi, a few questions...

Isn't OpenSSL 3.1 needed to build FP 3.1? In other words FP 3.1 isn't a self contained entity. Isn't the case that CVE fixes affecting FP 3.1 has to be delivered in OpenSSL 3.1?

Craig Lorentzen

@Norman Ashley Disclaimer: I am not a compliance expert and I am not your compliance expert. Commentary is about technical feasibility, not necessarily what compliance/regulators will want for your software environments.

I read the comment as, and OpenSSL Members can confirm, security issues (CVEs) which impact the FIPS module will be back-ported to the 3.1 code base. - To be documented

One can then pull the code for Openssl 3.1 which can build the FIPS module without known CVEs. Businesses who wish to, or are told by compliance/regulators that they must use a FIPS 140-3 module, may continue using the 3.1 module, and use that module with another supported OpenSSL release. Businesses will need to work with their compliance contacts to determine if they should/must take the security fixes or migrate to other releases.

There will be performance tradeoffs, but in my mind if a Business needs FIPS 140-3 validated cryptography instead of 140-2, then you may build OpenSSL 3.1 w/ the FIPS module, store the 3.1 module to replace the module built with another selected OpenSSL 3.x version as your base provider and executables, e.g. OpenSSL 3.5.

Neil Horman

Norman/Craig

Just want to give you some (hopefully) detailed insight into how FIPS code is managed within openssl, so that you can align that with how FIPS certification is handled, in an effort to give you some better understanding of the situation here.

Branching/Tagging Strategy/background

openssl releases are managed in a per-branch stragegy. That is to say, when we release the alpha version of a given major/minor relelease, we create a unique branch for that release, rooted at the latest commit of the master branch of the repository. That is to say, openssl-3.1 is its own branch, as is openssl-3.2, openssl-3.3, openssl-3.4, openssl-3.5, soon to be openssl-4.0. Note that these branches are named with a given major and minor version number.

When a release is produced, that release is tagged with the requisite patch level of that release (following semantic version rules). i.e. there is a tag for release openssl-3.0.0, openssl 3.0.1, etc. Visually the branches/tags of the tree look like this:

https://docs.google.com/drawings/d/1MWCwlYrsu3ITctbvPrUv_bsPR-QU6AWXmNHpTwfHd6s/edit?usp=sharing

So, each major/minor release pair has a branch, and each specific release has a tag

As we develop code, if a backport for a fix is required, we apply it to the required branches, and when we release a new patch level update for that branch it gets a new tag. This includes all fixes, including those which are CVE-relelvant, either to the core library or the fips provider

Understanding the relation to FIPS certification

Some of our Releases are FIPS certified. For instance, We have a FIPS-140-2 certification for our 3.0.8 and 3.0.9 releases, as well as a FIPS-140-3 certification for our 3.1.2 release. Note those are for specific releases. That is to say, there is no provision for saying that the 3.3.0 release is "close enough" to the 3.1.2 release to still be FIPS compilant. If you want to be FIPS compliant, you must use the 3.0.8, 3.0.9 or 3.1.2 release (dependent on which FIPS certification you want to claim compliance with)

Allowing for the use of updated openssl libraries with compliant providers

OpenSSL guarantees binary compatibility with the fips provider from any release against any other openssl release. That is to say if you want to use the fips provider (codified as the built fips.so module) from a FIPS certified release with a later release of openssl (codified as the libcrypto.so and libssl.so modules). So for example, say you want to leverage the latest features from openssl-3.5.0 while still remaining FIPS compliant. You can do that by building openssl-3.5.0, then building openssl-3.1.2, and simply copying the fips.so module from your openssl-3.1.2 tree into the openssl-3.5.0 tree. We provide instructions on how to do this in each release. This allows for end users to pick up fixes for various bugs/cve's/etc while still remaining FIPS compliant.

Understanding how we handle CVE's within the FIPS provider.

As Norman alluded to, sometimes it may occur that a given CVE may be encountered which modifies code within the FIPS provider, and the question becomes "what do we do about that?". As noted above, FIPS compliance is attached to a specific openssl release, and as such, remaining FIPS compliant for an end user implies that they cannot move to a later patch release to mitigate a CVE. They must remain on that certified release, regardless of the impact of any newly discovered CVE within the fips provider

There is however a way out of this situation. FIPS allows for an update process (in FIPS-140-3 its called an UPDT process, in 140-2 I believe its called the scenario 3A process). In this process we would work with our lab to indicate that we are addressing a CVE, and the changes to the FIPS provider are very limited. Our lab would then work with NIST in an accelerated review process to validate the new code (i.e. much more quickly than the full validation process). The outcome of that process would be a new certificate, issued from NIST referencing the new openssl release as being FIPS certified, which we would then publish for availability to our end users, how could then update to that release, providing mitigation for the relevant CVE, without sacrificing FIPS validation.

Closing thoughts

I should note here that, nominally CVE's relevant to the fips provider are only considered for re-certification at (I think) medium and higher severity). Low severity items are not currently considered for re-certification. To the best of my knoweldge we have not encountered a high severity CVE within the bounds of our FIPS provider, and so have not had to go through this process to date.

Hope that helps.

Neil

Craig Lorentzen

@Neil Horman Thanks for the detailed response. I feel like I understand all of that; branches and tags separating trains and releases, and FIPS certificates are a point in time validated of the specific cryptographic module, in OpenSSL terms fips provider. The item that I am not seeing concrete documentation on is how End of Support (EoS) is handled.

3.1 is now EoS, to me that means there is no support provided on that train, e.g. one would not expect code fixes of any type committed to the public branch and no new publicly tagged releases. However, it is suggested that OpenSSL intends to ensure CVE fixes which impact the 3.1 FIPS provider will continue to be committed...I would like to see a clear document on how OpenSSL sees the public maintenance of the FIPS provider in a EoS branch/train.

For clarity, I am fully aware that FIPS validity is connected to the specific tested version. While the specifics of a company's regulatory compliance is a concern, I am talking about the security implications here and leave it to individual company's and their compliance contacts/contracts to guide and balance the need for picking up CVE fixes within the FIPS module (provider).

Benjamin

@Neil Horman Thank you for this response. I did want to clarify on reason why support for the 3.1 branch specifically is important for large businesses:

One big driver for using FIPS-140 validated modules is FedRAMP. The FedRAMP Policy for Cryptographic Module Selection recognizes the tension between the use of validated modules and patching security issues. It therefore explicitly directs CSPs to prefer using patched modules, even if not validated. (This is reinforced throughout the policy - e.g. "CSPs shall determine if updating to a newer version of the software, whether or not its cryptographic modules are FIPS validated, would eliminate the vulnerabilities; if it would, CSPs shall promptly update if that is feasible.")

FedRAMP further goes on to distinguish "modules that are derived from an update stream of an existing validated module" from those that are not. That is why it is so important to consumers of the 3.1 module to have support on the 3.1 branch.

Neil Horman

Ok, thank you for the clarification. The only input I think I can reasonably make on the support question is historic, in that for all our releases we indicate that we offer premium support contracts on releases that are beyond their EoL dates for this purpose:
https://openssl-corporation.org/support/
We've done this for openssl 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 (which of course don't have FIPS certifications attached to them), but regardless, thats how we have traditionally handled support for releases beyond those dates. I would expect that, if a using entity wishes to ensure support/CVE updates to 3.0.8/3.0.9 between now and the FIPS certificate sunset date (Sept 21, 2026), that a premium support contract would be the path forward, though I've not seen any documentation spelling that out specifically, nor am I aware of any technical methodology for how we will administer that (i.e. will we keep updating a private fork of the repo for those with support contracts).

Craig Lorentzen

This is something I think OpenSSL needs to provide a clear and detailed document so that companies can make an informed decision when selecting versions of the FIPS module and surrounding OpenSSL software.

Jeff Johnson

@Neil Horman If I am not mistaken, the support contracts only apply to LTS branches. OpenSSL 3.1 is not an LTS branch, hence the desire for more clarification around EOS. BTW, thank you for the discussion. It is very helpful to the community, as Craig L. is pointing out.

Anton Arapov

@Jeff Johnson  The commercial support contract includes all supported versions of the OpenSSL library until their official end-of-life (EOL), and extends support for long-term support (LTS) versions beyond their EOL.

Jeff Johnson

@Anton Arapov Yes, so accordingly OpenSSL3.1 from your support page... "Version 3.1 will be supported until 2025-03-14". Am I perhaps confusing EOL and EOS? My understanding (fully aware of how wrong I can be sometime), is that the support contracts were for LTS branches and while supported branches like 3.1 will continue to get security fixes during their support period (a fixed 2 year length of time), after that time they would not be supported.

Anton Arapov

@Jeff Johnson  OpenSSL 3.1 is not an LTS release and is supported for a fixed 2-year period, ending on 2025-03-14. During that time, it receives security updates. After that date, it reaches end of life (EOL) and will no longer be supported. Only LTS releases like 3.0 and 3.5 are eligible for extended commercial support through contracts.

The release cycle graph on that page might be helpful: https://openssl-library.org/roadmap/index.html

Note that starting with OpenSSL 3.6, regular releases are supported for a fixed 1-year period instead of 2.

Jeff Johnson

@Anton Arapov That was exactly my understanding, thanks for confirming. That leads to the question that @Benjamin has posed. I know it seems like a simple concept but can be confusing when you have requirements that raise a lot of doubts (like FedRamp), so again, really appreciate the time given to this.

Yi Ouyang

Maybe this was concluded and announced somewhere? Is FIPS module 3.1.2 still supported until FIPS module on 3.5 gets the certificate? If it is out of support, then we should use FIPS module on 3.5 then?

Craig Lorentzen

@Anton Arapov Did The OpenSSL Corporation agree on language confirming how CVE fixes within the boundary will be made available to 3.1.2 FIPS module consumers?

Please share the public documentation to close on this issue so that consumers of this module are fully aware of the plans for backport availability. It is important that businesses can reference the ongoing security maintenance plan in their complaince story.

Jeff Johnson

@Anton Arapov , @Neil Horman - Did we firm this up?

Anton Arapov

@Jeff Johnson This has been agreed, but I haven’t yet reflected it on our public pages - it’s been sitting in my backlog.

That said, it’s time to close the gap. I will make sure we have the language finalized and published this month. Please hold me to that.

Apologies, @Craig , for the delay here, and thank you again for the wording you suggested earlier - it’s been helpful in shaping this.

Craig Lorentzen

@Anton Arapov Happy to help, looking forward to seeing the policy document.

Jeff Johnson

@Anton @Neil Horman So with the CVE announcement yesterday there was one inside the FIPS boundary: CVE-2026-42770. However there is no corresponding mention of it being fixed or affected in the announcement. What is the disposition of this CVE in regards to FP 3.1.2? What about rebrands?

Additionally, is OpenSSL pursuing an UPDT to the affected FP's?

I added to this thread because it was basically the same subject.

thx,

-jj

Jeff Johnson

@Tomas Mraz So code changes for the user. Still have 2 questions? Is the FP for 3.1.2 supported (it isn't listed as affected on the page you sent). And for any FP affected is there going to be CMVP UPDT pursued?

Craig Lorentzen

@Tomas Mraz 

Thank you for confirming that CVE-2026-42770 affects the 3.1.2 FIPS module. However, two issues remain unresolved, both of which are the exact concerns for which this thread was raised.

The FIPS CVE page has dropped 3.1 from the newer entries.

https://openssl-library.org/news/fips-cve/ includes the 3.1 module for older CVEs (those fixed through 3.1.8), but the recent 2026 CVEs — including CVE-2026-42770 which you just confirmed impacts 3.1.2 — only list fix versions for 3.0, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 4.0. There is no 3.1 row. This forces customers to make assumptions about whether their actively-certified module is vulnerable — assumptions they should not have to make when OpenSSL has the definitive answer. The page needs to explicitly state the impact to 3.1 for every CVE where it applies, even when no fix version exists yet.

CVE-2026-42770

3.0.21
3.4.6
3.5.7
3.6.3
4.0.1

yes

FFC-DH (X9.42/DHX) peer validation uses the
attacker-supplied q instead of the local key’s q,
skipping proper subgroup membership checking.
Workaround: Call EVP_PKEY_parameters_eq() to compare
the parameters of the remote and local keys
before performing the key exchange.

Workarounds do not replace fix commits for centralized remediation.

The suggested workaround — calling EVP_PKEY_parameters_eq() before every DH key exchange — requires each consumer to audit and modify every call site across their entire portfolio. For organizations running this module across hundreds of services, that is not centralized remediation. It is an unbounded application-level campaign.

As Benjamin noted earlier in this thread, FedRAMP policy explicitly permits security fixes to validated modules and distinguishes "modules derived from an update stream of an existing validated module." The mechanism exists for library-level fixes to be applied once and deployed centrally. Expecting every consumer to independently implement a workaround at the application layer is not an equivalent outcome.

What we need:

1. Add 3.1 impact to the newer CVE entries on the FIPS CVE page — if the module is affected, say so publicly, even if no fix version is available yet. The page currently hides the situation.

2. Make fix commits publicly available for CVEs that impact the 3.1 FIPS boundary until module sunset (2030-03-10) or with a suitable notification period after 3.5's FIPS 140-3 module is validated. Consumers need to be able to patch the module centrally rather than campaign workaround code changes across every application.

This situation is precisely what this thread was intended to address. In April, Anton committed to publishing policy language on FIPS module maintenance; that timeline has now passed. In the interim, a CVE affecting the FIPS boundary has been identified in the only FIPS 140-3 validated OpenSSL module. At this point, consumers have no documented impact assessment on the public page, no fix commits, and no stated remediation plan — the available workaround is not practical at scale.

Milan Broz

We are working on this.

The CVE page needs an update for 3.1: according to my notes, 25 (of 41) CVEs (since EOL) affect 3.1 in general.

For the FIPS 3.1 provider, the exact steps are being discussed internally. Stay tuned, please.

Jeff Johnson

@Milan Broz Has any progress been made on this issue? Looking forward to hearing the path forward for FP3.1. Thanks!

Milan Broz

Hi Jeff,

Since upstream 3.1 has reached end of life, we have prepared an internal build containing the related CVE fixes, which is currently undergoing lab analysis. This build is being handled internally by OpenSSL Corporation in a manner similar to extended support.

The next steps are still being discussed with the lab, so I'm unfortunately not able to share more details at this point. Anton should be able to provide further information later.

Thank you for your patience.

Anton Arapov

The policy this thread asked for is published:

Project policy: https://openssl-library.org/policies/general/fips-module-support-policy/
Corporation delivery terms: https://openssl-corporation.org/solutions-fips-policy.html
Validated modules and certificate end dates: https://openssl-library.org/news/fips-cve/

Answers to the questions still open here:

@Yi Ouyang : yes. The 3.1.2 module is supported for the lifetime of certificate #4985, until 10 March 2030. This does not depend on the 3.5 validation.

@Jeff Johnson : the 3.1.2 provider is supported (policy, section 2). A CVE re-validation of certificate #4985 is underway, adding 3.1.9 alongside 3.1.2, so existing validations remain valid; the CMVP handles this scenario on an expedited track. Certificates derived from #4985 by rebranding can take the corresponding update once the base re-validation completes.

@Norman Ashley : correct, the module is built from 3.1 source. Maintenance source releases exist for that purpose (3.1.9), produced after public support ends and delivered through support agreements. The module version matches the release it is built from; there are no FIPS-only branches (policy, section 4).

@Chris Brych : instead of extending 3.1 library support, module support is tied to the certificate lifetime, which runs past both dates you mentioned.

@Craig Lorentzen : the FIPS and CVEs page now carries per-CVE module impact including end-of-life versions, and from the next release advisories state module impact for every actively validated module. Thank you for the November draft language and for keeping this thread alive since March 2025.

This closes the thread from our side. :-)